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Reflections on President Macron’s 
“Case For Europe” 
By Professor Alex de Ruyter, Director, Centre for Brexit Studies 
President Macron recently outlined his view of what direction the EU 
might take in future, particularly in response to Brexit and other 
challenges. For Macron, Brexit serves as a “wake up call” to the EU in 
terms of the need to connect with a bigger vision of the founding 
principles of the EU as a means to preserve peace in a continent with 
an obviously turbulent past. For him the “European Project” is also a 
means to promote shared prosperity and enable a group of 28 small 
countries (in world terms) to better meet the challenges of migration, 
environmental degradation and regulating corporate excesses (for 
example Macron has referred to combatting the power of the tech 
giants; Google and Amazon etc.). 
He also sees Brexit in terms of a populist (that is right-wing populist) 
challenge to peace and stability in Europe as such movements 
espouse a return to xenophobic nationalism as a simple solution 
caused by the problems of modernity. Macron is astute enough to 
realise that globalisation has not delivered benefits to everyone in the 
EU and that more needs to be done to share prosperity (for example 
his call for an EU-instituted minimum wage). 
He also stated that the bloc is in need of a “renaissance”. I think that 
few would see the EU falling apart as entailing any good for peace 
and prosperity in Europe. That said, its mechanisms are in need of 
reform. In essence, in my view there are two issues: that of 
governance and accountability, and also what level of economic and 
political integration works best. I think the issues around governance 
and accountability are largely that of perception. Whilst it is true that 
EU citizens do not elect key officials such as Donald Tusk or Jean-
Claude Juncker, the member countries via their leaders do. 
European citizens also elect MEPs to the EU Parliament and this 
body does have a veto ability over key aspects of EU policy (for 
example, its assent is needed to approve the Brexit agreement). 
Reform here could consist of further measures to enhance its powers, 
such as a greater ability to propose and enact legislation – of course, 
this would take us down the road towards EU-federalism. Related to 
this would be an increased need for engagement by national 
governments to pro-actively educate their citizens on what the EU 
does – and does not – do. This was all too evident in the lead-up to 
the 2016 referendum in the UK where factual conversations on the 
nature and operations on the EU (and the UK’s actual decision-
making abilities within it), were sadly lacking. 
This leads me to my second point, being that further economic 
integration, I think, would also be necessary for the EU to prosper in 
the future. The fundamental problem here, of course, is to what extent 
the member countries are willing to pool further sovereignty at EU 
level. Member states retain their own ability to set fiscal policy and 
vary tax rates for example and jealously guard this. In contrast, 
monetary policy is set at EU-level for those who have the Euro. 
However, a common monetary policy without offsetting fiscal 
mechanisms, is a “blunt tool” and meaning that areas that lag behind 
the “boom regions” of the EU suffer when the ECB raises interest 
rates. It is for this reason, I think, that further fiscal integration could 
be necessary. 
Of course, this would require buy-in from the biggest net contributors 
to the EU budget, namely Germany. To date, the German government 
has been reluctant to entertain this and Macron has struggled in his 
efforts to persuade them otherwise. Still, it is possible the current 
context could lead to a re-think by the more fiscally conservative 
(Germany, Netherlands etc.) members of the EU. 
With regard to the UK’s vote to leave the EU, much attention has 
been focussed on Poland and Hungary for example as drifting into the 
right-wing populist domain (as the approach of Viktor Orban has 
demonstrated) or otherwise the presence of far-right parties in 
coalition governments (e.g., Sweden, Austria). However, to date none 
of these countries have expressed any formal intent or desire to leave 
the EU. It was notable that after the Brexit vote in 2016, many right-
wing pundits (Nigel Farage amongst them) were confident that Brexit 
would trigger a domino effect and that the Netherlands, France and 
Austria (each of which have vocal right-wing groups in the form of 
Wilders and Le Pen for example) would follow suit. This did not 
happen. Le Pen only achieved 35% of the vote in the final run-off for 
the French presidency. 
Nevertheless, for Macron, the dangers of far-right parties seizing a 
significant vote in the upcoming EU Parliament elections in May (and 
the prospect of another run-off against Le Pen in the next French 
presidential elections) remain very real, and hence his call for a 
renewal of the European project and re-engagement with the 
citizenry. It is notable that Macron has stated that the UK would find a 
“natural home” in such a Europe (EU) – perhaps suggesting that he 
thinks that the UK might yet change its mind on Brexit, as talk of a 
possible “second referendum” attests. 
Finally, Macron also called for a ban of foreign powers financing EU 
parties. This proposal, I would suggest, is aimed at non-European 
“powers” (although this could mean countries or individuals). The 
Brexit context is notable to the extent that there is continued 
controversy in the UK over the extreme likelihood that particular 
Leave campaigns were funded by foreign interests and it is this, I 
believe, that Macron is trying to illustrate as a warning for the EU in 
tightening up funding rules going forward. 
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